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Introduct ion 
 
Welcome to the 47th edition of the EUCERS Newsletter for 
the (quiet) month of August.  
 
This issue’s general article section includes two pieces. 
First, Francesco Ventura, research associate at EUCERS, 
writes on the terrible trinity of war, water and energy in the 
Middle East. 
 
Secondly, Mogha Bassim, lecturer at the University of 
Buckingham, analyses the trends, uncertainties and risks in 
oil prices in the medium-term. 
 
In our Activities section, we report from our most recent 
EUCERS Executive Summer School. 
 
In EUCERS on the Road we continue to inform you about 
conference participation and presentations of our 
members, as well as latest publications. 
 
I hope you enjoy the newsletter! 
 
Justus Andreas 
Research Associate and Newsletter Editor at EUCERS, King’s 
College London 
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ARTICLES	  
 
The war, peak water and the energy nexus in Syria 
and Iraq 
Francesco Ventura 
 
The Middle East is facing a water crisis. The 
ongoing conflict in Syria and the struggle in Iraq are 
even worsening the situation. An International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) report1 warned 
how war is bringing region's water supplies to a 
breaking point. The connection between water crises 
and war is deep and known. In Syria, it was a long 
drought that started in 2006, along with other 
factors, such as a repressive regime, an erosion of 
economic health and the region's balance change, 
that brought social and political frictions to the 
boiling point2. The following use of water as a tool 
and weapon, especially by the fundamentalist 
organisation Islamic State (IS), has been accelerating 
the depletion of freshwater. The passing of peak 
water in Syria and Iraq could have significant 
implications for energy, because of the water-energy 
nexus. The peak water is a concept analogous to the 
idea of peak oil: the point “at which we run up 
against natural limits to availability or human use of 
freshwater”3. The water-energy nexus means that in 
order to use water for economic purposes there is 
need of a large amount of energy. Similarly, many 
technical processes within the energy cycle need a 
large amount of water4. 
 
                                                   
1	   International	  Committee	  of	  the	  Red	  Cross	  (2015),	  Bled	  Dry.	  
How	  war	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  is	  bringing	  the	  region's	  water	  
supplies	  to	  breaking	  point.	  An	  ICRC	  report.	  ICRC,	  March,	  
http://www.icrcproject.org/app/water-­‐in-­‐middle-­‐
east/PDF/full_report-­‐water-­‐middle-­‐east-­‐icrc.pdf.	  	  
2	   Joshua	  Hammer	  (2013),	  “Is	  a	  Lack	  of	  Water	  to	  Blame	  for	  the	  
Conflict	  in	  Syria?”,	  Smithsonian	  Magazine,	  June,	  
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/is-­‐a-­‐lack-­‐of-­‐
water-­‐to-­‐blame-­‐for-­‐the-­‐conflict-­‐in-­‐syria-­‐72513729/?no-­‐
ist=.	  	  
3	   Meena	  Palaniappan	  and	  Peter	  H.	  Gleick	  (2009),	  “Peak	  
Water”,The	  World's	  Water	  2008-­‐2009,	  Island	  Press,	  
Washington	  DC,	  1-­‐16,	  p.	  1.	  
4	   Afreen	  Siddiqi	  and	  Laura	  Diaz	  Anadon	  (2011),	  “The	  water-­‐
energy	  nexus	  in	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa”Energy	  Policy,	  
No.	  39,	  August,	  4529-­‐4540,	  p.	  4530.	  
The Euphrates and Tigris are the main source of 
water for Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Especially the 
Euphrates river is of critical importance. Flowing for 
2,700 kilometres from Turkey to the Persian Gulf, it 
supports over 60 million people. The three riparian 
states have built several structures aimed to use its 
water for the economic development since the early 
70s. In the past 50 years this has included 
approximately 32 dams and barrages, causing a 40-
45 percent reduction in water flow5. Turkey has not 
signed the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the 
Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses. 
Consequently, the lack of general agreements on 
water sharing and the lack of coordination between 
each state on water management, as well as a 
growing water-intensive agriculture have led to 
over-exploitation of the river.  
 
The violent conflict and the weakness of institutions 
in Syria and Iraq are two important reasons for a 
renovated aggressive approach towards water 
exploitation by the local actors. The IS militias have 
taken control of vast parts of the Euphrates valley in 
Syria and Iraq and its hydraulic structures, from the 
Tabqah Dam in the Syrian sector of the river to the 
Ramadi Dam, west of Falluja in Iraq, pushing south 
to Haditah Dam, the second largest of the Euphrates. 
Since 2013, when IS seized the Tabqah Dam, the 
river level has dropped dramatically6. Furthermore, 
since the Islamic militias captured the Ramadi 
                                                   
5	   M.	  Nouar	  Shamout	  and	  Glada	  Lahn	  (2015),	  The	  Euphrates	  in	  
Crisis.	  Channels	  of	  Cooperation	  for	  a	  Threatened	  River,	  
Energy,	  Environment	  and	  Resources	  Research	  Paper,	  
Chatham	  House,	  April,	  p.	  2,	  
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/f
ield/field_document/20150413Euphrates_0.pdf.	  	  
6	   Ibid.,	  p.	  24.	  
Francesco Ventura is a political 
analyst, focused on Turkey, the 
Middle East, hydro-politics, energy 
security and geopolitics. He holds an 
MA in International Politics and 
European Studies from Florence 
University (cum laude, 110/110) and 
contributes at different Italian 
geopolitical magazines, such as Limes, 
Eurasia and Altitude.  
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barrage, the river flow has dropped below 50 percent 
of previous levels, according to Furat al-Timimi of 
Iraq's parliamentary Agriculture and Water 
Committee7. Also, IS has already given proof to be 
able to use water as a weapon by flooding Abu 
Ghraib and drying the marshlands in the south of 
Iraq, inhabited by Shiite population, as already 
Saddam Hussein did in the 90s. 
 
On the other side, Syrian and Iraqi governments and 
IS are blaming Turkey for limiting the water flow 
Euphrates. Last June, Syrian Minister of Water 
Resources Dr. Kamal al-Sheikah and his Iraqi 
counterpart Eng. Mohsin Al-Shammari met to 
discuss the decreased flow of water from Turkey to 
Syria and Iraq. They accused Turkey of violating 
the laws and regulations governing the distribution of 
water between them. They stressed that the flow at 
Jarablus, on the Turkish-Syrian border, was 330 
cubic meters per second, instead of the agreed 500 
cubic meters8. Turkey, for its part, rejected 
accusations, blaming the inefficient hydraulic system 
in Syria and Iraq and the use of water as a weapon 
by the Islamic State. However, Ankara added that it 
has to look after its own and it continues to construct 
the final six dams of its 22-dam project, the South-
Eastern Anatolia Project, known better with its 
Turkish acronym GAP9. Turkey supplies 89 percent 
of the Euphrates' water flow, since the river and most 
of its tributaries are generated in Turkish territory. 
Furthermore, Turkey adopts the absolute territorial 
sovereignty principle for its water and owns 141 
dams on the Euphrates and its tributaries, with an 
estimated 90 billion cubic meters of water-storage 
capacity, the equivalent of two to three years of the 
                                                   
7	   Joanna	  Paraszczuk	  (2015),	  “IS	  'Water	  War'	  Dries	  Marshes	  In	  
Southern	  Iraq”,Radio	  Free	  Europe/Radio	  Liberty,	  June	  28,	  
http://www.rferl.org/content/is-­‐water-­‐war-­‐dries-­‐marshes-­‐
in-­‐southern-­‐iraq/27098762.html.	  	  
8	   M.	  Nassr/Mazen	  (2015),	  “Water	  Resources	  Minister:	  Turkey	  
violets	  agreements	  on	  water	  share”,	  SANA,	  June	  17,	  
http://sana.sy/en/?p=45392.	  	  
9	   Zaid	  Sabah,	  Selcan	  Hacaoglu,	  Jack	  Fairweather	  (2015),	  
“Water	  Shortages	  Unite	  Iraq,	  Islamic	  State	  Against	  Turkey”,	  
Bloomberg	  Business,	  July	  2,	  
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-­‐07-­‐
01/water-­‐shortages-­‐unite-­‐iraq-­‐islamic-­‐state-­‐against-­‐turkey.	  	  
entire flow. So, Turkey owns an incredible tool of 
pressure on its downstream riparians. 
 
The consequence of these significant shortcomings in 
the regional water management is a dramatic 
shortage of water. In Syria, many cases report that 
the rate of water loss due to damage is continuing to 
increase. As result, there is an over-pumping of water 
from regulated and unregulated wells for drinking, 
sanitation and electricity production10. This trend 
meets another terrible evolution in these lands: 
climate change. A study led by Professor Jay 
Famiglietti and his research team for NASA revealed 
that Arabian aquifer, the groundwater of the 
Euphrates-Tigris basin, had lost 144 cubic kilometres 
of freshwater between 2003 and 2009, an amount 
equivalent to the Dead Sea11. As Dr. Famiglietti 
wrote in a post, the level of water began dropping 
more quickly12. The drought of surface water, the 
limit to the river flow by Turkey and the sectarian 
use of water by the warring parties caused a further 
reliance on the groundwater. People have dug 
several wells, many unreported, in order to provide 
themselves the necessary water. However, depletion 
of groundwater leads to impoverishment of soil, 
exacerbating dryness and the ability of land to retain 
water. 
 
At this point, a serious risk deriving from the 
encounter of water stress and war is to reach and 
surpass peak water. Without an appropriate 
management it could lead to catastrophic 
consequences for both humans and ecosystem. The 
Pacific Institute has pinpointed three different 
concepts of peak water: peak renewable water, peak 
                                                   
10	   ICRC	  (2015),	  p.	  5.	  
11	   Katalyn	  A.	  Voss,	  James	  S.	  Famiglietti,	  MinHui	  Lo,	  Caroline	  de	  
Linage,	  Matthew	  Rodell,	  Sean	  C.	  Swenson	  (2013),	  
“Groundwater	  depletion	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  from	  GRACE	  
with	  implications	  for	  transboundary	  water	  management	  in	  
the	  Tigris-­‐Euphrates-­‐Western	  Iran	  region”,	  Water	  Resources	  
Research,	  Vol.	  49,	  No.	  2,	  February,	  904-­‐914,	  
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/wrcr.20078/full
.	  	  
12	   Jay	  Famiglietti	  (2013),	  “Water	  and	  the	  Root	  of	  Violent	  
Conflict	  in	  Syria”,	  The	  World	  Post,	  July	  9,	  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jay-­‐famiglietti/water-­‐and-­‐
the-­‐roots-­‐of-­‐vi_b_3884175.html.	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nonrenewable water, peak ecological water13. 
Although estimating the time when the surface 
renewable water could reach its peak is a highly 
complex task, the peak of nonrenewable water is 
similar to the traditional peak oil. It concerns the 
level of groundwater: when production rates 
substantially exceed natural recharge rates and when 
over-pumping or contamination leads to a peak of 
production followed by a decline14. This is exactly 
what is currently happening in Syria and Iraq. Very 
close to this is the peak ecological water: the 
exceeding of the “point of water use that causes 
serious or irreversible ecological damage”15.  
 
In summary, the Euphrates and Tigris region is 
suffering from a variety of highly adverse 
developments that include Turkey limiting the 
rivers’ water flows, IS targeting water structures in 
its occupied territories, while Syrian and Iraqi water 
systems continue to suffer from inefficiencies and the 
Iraqi marshlands and the Arabian aquifers are drying 
out, with all factors leading to a rapidly increasing 
cost of water. However, another nightmare is 
looming: the water-energy nexus. Notwithstanding 
the Middle East being a fossil fuel-rich region, in 
order to produce energy it needs water, and to use 
water it needs energy. Water extraction, treatment, 
distribution and disposal processes consume a large 
amount of energy. Similarly, many technical 
processes of harnessing, extracting and producing 
energy require a large amount of water16. For 
example, Iraq, which is one of the biggest oil 
producers in the world, requires growing amounts of 
water to sustain its growth in oil production, because 
water is injected into oilfields to support reservoir 
pressure17. The Iraqi government put a great trust in 
the CSSF project, which will have to bring seawater 
into southern oilfields. However, as IEA underlined, 
                                                   
13	   The	  Pacific	  Institute,	  Peak	  Water,	  
http://pacinst.org/issues/sustainable-­‐water-­‐management-­‐
local-­‐to-­‐global/peak-­‐water/.	  	  
14	   Ibid.	  	  
15	   Meena	  Palaniappan	  and	  Peter	  H.	  Gleick	  (2009),	  p.	  10.	  
16	   Afreen	  Siddiqi	  and	  Laura	  Diaz	  Anadon	  (2011)	  p.	  4530.	  	  
17	   Saltanat	  Berdikeva	  (2012),	  “No	  Water,	  No	  Gain	  for	  Iraq's	  Oil	  
Development”,	  National	  Geographic,	  November	  13,	  
http://energyblog.nationalgeographic.com/2012/11/13/no-­‐
water-­‐no-­‐gain-­‐for-­‐iraqs-­‐oil-­‐development/.	  	  
“water that is not supplied from the CSSF would 
need to be sourced from aquifers and surface 
water”18. So, the depletion of groundwater and the 
growing scarcity of surface freshwater are able to 
lead to alarming energy shortcomings.  
 
In Syria and Iraq we can observe a terrible trinity the 
war, the risk of peak water and its energy nexus. It 
seems that it is impossible to solve any of these 
problems individually. But it seems clear that a peak 
water of the aquifers will be an element fostering the 
conflict itself and as such also the complication for an 
efficient production and use of both water and 
energy. 
 
 
Future expectations for energy in the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) region 
Dr Mogha Bassim 
 
The importance of the energy of the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA region) to the world and the 
MENA region itself stems from the fact that 5 out of 
the top 10 of the major oil producers worldwide are 
located in this region. In addition the five countries 
(Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, UAE and Libya) 
hold 50.5% of the total world reserve19. 
 
Furthermore, the cost of production per barrel in the 
MENA region is cheaper when compared to the 
other oil producing countries and particularly when 
compared to the cost of North Sea, Canadian oil 
sands, or US Shale20.	  	  
	  
	  
                                                   
18	   IEA	  (2012),	  Iraq	  Energy	  Outlook,	  World	  Energy	  Outlook	  
Special	  Report,	  November	  12,	  p.	  68.	  
19
 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 20 August 2015 
https:// www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2244rank.html 
20 Marina Petroleka “Outlook for Oil Prices & Iran's Return To Market”, 
European Centre for Energy & Resource Security Department of War 
Studies(EUCERS), King’s College London, Issue 46, July 2015.  
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Oil Price Sensitivity  
The oil market prices are highly sensitive and 
respond fast to sudden economic crises, political 
changes and conflicts21 which would affect oil 
demand or supply. The East Asia economic crises in 
the Nineties drove the oil prices down to less than 
US$10/bbl. On the other hand the Middle East 
conflict in the seventies drove the price up 4 times 
with only 7 % reduction in world production over a 
period of just 6 month. Similarly, the changes in 
Iran’s political regime at the end of the seventies 
followed by the Iraq-Iran war in 1980 which 
reduced the world production by approx. 10%, 
drove the price to a high US$ 100 approx. (adjusted 
for inflation for 2010). 
 
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), established in 1960, has at times with some 
success been able to stabilise the oil prices by 
controlling the supply side quantities in order to 
avoid the extreme conditions of high oil price surges 
and possible recession. OPEC unfortunately has 
limited tools to enforce the control of production of 
its member countries, and even less control for the 
non-member oil producing countries. Furthermore, 
OPEC is faced with the challenge of sensitive oil 
prices that highly responsive to crises.  
 
Recent Developments in Oil Prices 
During the past few years oil prices sustained a high 
level of US$ 100 and higher. Production of Shale oil 
in USA experienced spectacular growth, altered 
crude and oil product flows and shifted the perceived 
situation in the oil market from scarcity to 
abundance. Several factors contributed to the 
growth in production including innovations in 
extraction and treatment as well as Government 
financial support for the smaller entrepreneurial 
companies in the U.S. light tight oil (LTO) sector, 
and the reduced cost of the oil services industry 22.  
                                                   
21	   BP,	   Crude	   Oil	   Prices	   1861-­‐2014,	   August	   2015,	  
http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-­‐bp/energy-­‐
economics/statistical-­‐review-­‐of-­‐world-­‐energy/review-­‐by-­‐energy-­‐type/oil/oil-­‐
prices.html	  
22 Clingendael International Energy Program, The Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies, King Abdulla Petroleum Studies and Research Center (KAPSARC), 
“CRUDE OIL MARKETS IN 2015: THE BATTLE FOR MARKET 
SHARE”, July 2015. 
A sudden drop occurred in oil prices from approx. 
US$ 105 down to half this value in few weeks in the 
second half of 2014, and with the decision of OPEC 
towards the end of the year to let the market 
determine the price together with an increase in 
world production, the price plunged further down. 
   
Future Expectations for Oil  
Projections and future expectations remain always 
associated with some uncertainties and risks, which 
have to be evaluated in order to plan ahead strategies 
for elimination or control, should these occur. This is 
particularly the case for oil future expectations due to 
its high sensitivity to changes. BP listed a number of 
the uncertainties in their energy outlook for 2035 23 
related to GDP Growth, Climate Policies, 
Geopolitics and China’s Electrification, all of which 
remain relevant to the expectations in this article.  
 
First, the future expectation of oil demand  
 
Primary energy consumption is expected to increase 
by 37% between 2013 and 2035, with growth 
averaging 1.4% p.a 24. Oil demand will continue to 
grow due to the growth in demand in China, East 
Asia and several other countries like India and Japan 
as well as the growth in consumption within the oil 
producing and non-producing countries in MENA. 
Population and GDP growth will contribute to the 
growth in energy demand. 
                                                   
23	  BP	  Energy	  Outlook	  2035,	  Feb.	  2015,	  pp	  78	  
24	  Ibid,	  pp	  11	  
Dr Mogha Bassim has been a 
lecturer in Economic and 
Econometrics since 2005 and 
joined the University of 
Buckingham in 2012. She is 
specialised in lecturing the 
Economics of the Middle East.  
 
 Page 7 
0	  50,000,000,000	  
100,000,000,000	  150,000,000,000	  
200,000,000,000	  250,000,000,000	  
300,000,000,000	  350,000,000,000	  
	  Venez
uela	  
	  Saudi	  
Arabia
	  
	  Canad
a	  	  	  	   	  Iran	  	  	   	  Iraq	  	   	  Kuwai
t	  	   UAE	  	  	  	   	  Russia
	  	   	  Libya	   	  	  Niger
ia	  	  	   	  USA	  
	  	  Kazak
hstan	   	  	  Qatar
	  	   	  China	   	  Brazil	  
	  
Algeria
	  
	  Mexico
	  
	  	  	  Ango
la	  	  	  
	  	  	  Ecuad
or	  	  	  
	  	  Azerb
aijan	  
Figure	  1:	  Crude	  Oil	  Proved	  Reserve	  (bbl)	  
Crude	  Oil	  Proved	  Reserve	  (bbl)	  
The demand is likely to be pushed up further by 
countries depleting their reserves. For example, the 
USA is producing 11,110,000 bbl/day from its 
relatively limited reserve of 30,530,000,000 bbl 25. 
While the USA is currently importing 8,527,000 
bbl/day and rated as the first crude oil importer in 
the world, shale oil 
production which may 
support part of the lost 
production and future 
increase in demand is still 
more expensive. 
 
Crude oil reserves for the 
top 20 countries with 
highest reserve and the 
current daily crude oil 
production levels are shown 
in fig (1) and fig (2) 
respectively. The figures are 
indicating how fast each of 
these larger reserves will be 
depleted. If production 
continues to be at the same daily rate, the US and 
Mexican reservoirs appear to be first to be depleted 
within the next 10 years, followed shortly afterwards 
by China. Currently, the production levels in these 
countries are 11,110,000 for the USA; 2,882,000 for 
Mexico and 4,180,000 bbl/day for China 
representing approx. 20% of the 95 000,000 bbl/day 
in current world demand. This together with the 
increase in demand in these countries will be turned 
into additional world demands. Part of this energy 
requirement is expected to be covered by the fast 
growing renewable energy and natural gas but part 
will remain as an additional demand on oil. This 
could push prices up considerably noticing the 
effects of the 7% and 10% production reductions on 
prices during the seventies.  
 
 
In the absence of new major discoveries of cheap oil 
with low extraction cost and considering the growth 
                                                   
25 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook 2014, 20 August 
2015 
https:// www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2244rank.html 
in demand, it would be reasonable to assume that the 
price will go up and can be controlled at certain 
levels by controlling the supply. 
 
Second, the future expectation of oil supply  
 
Oil revenues represent the major source of income 
for several of the main oil producers and the drop in 
oil prices is hurting all oil producers to varying 
degrees. However, for the industrial countries the 
excessive increase in crude oil costs affect the prices 
of final products and the markets in general and can 
lead to recession.   
 
The recent drop in oil prices in 2014/2015 can be 
attributed to have been initiated by improvements in 
extraction and processing of shale oil which resulted 
in a sudden growth in its supplied quantities. This 
was followed by OPEC’s decision to let the market 
determine the price and the increase in production 
by non-OPEC countries.  The re-entry of Iran to the 
oil supply market, when the sanctions lifting comes 
into effect, is expected to increase the supply even 
further and can put more pressure on current low oil 
prices.  
 
Producers with the low production cost in and 
outside the MENA region are expected to seek a 
reasonable margin of profit at supply levels which 
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Figure	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would enable each supplier to continue with the 
social and economic development programs.  
 
Provided that in the already unsettled MENA region 
countries do not experience sudden political turmoil, 
armed conflicts, or other shocks that can affect the 
oil market, the suppliers would be expected to seek a 
market balance in the shortest possible time. To 
allow for the impact of re-entry of Iran into the 
market next year a longer period of 1½ to 2 years 
may be expected to reach the market balance. 
Producers are under internal pressures and also from 
the producers most hurt by the fall in prices 26.  
 
Third, the future expectations for oil prices 
 
There have been different estimates for the expected 
future oil prices. Estimates by Bloomberg predict US 
$70/bbl average Brent price for 2016 whereas BMI 
predicts US$60/bbl 27. Traders predicted a much 
less figure of US$38/bbl as reported by CNBC. This 
is a wide range of expectations and the deletion of 
the low more conservative US$ 38 is probably 
appropriate.      
Fourth, other future expectations 
 
                                                   
26	   Pablo	   Cano	   “Trilla	   Oil,	   China	   and	   Venezuela:	   A	   Love	   Triangle?”,	   European	  
Centre	   for	   Energy	   &	   Resource	   Security	   Department	   of	   War	   Studies(EUCERS),	  
King’s	  College	  London,	  Issue	  No.41,	  Jan.	  2015.	  	  
27	  Marina	  Petroleka.	  “Outlook	  for	  Oil	  Prices	  &	  Iran's	  Return	  To	  Market”,	  Op.cit,	  	  
pp	  5	  
Given the continued improvement in technologies of 
oil extraction 28 , local oil producing companies may 
find themselves in a position where they have to 
accept difficult contract 
conditions with the 
specialized multinational 
oil companies in the future, 
and the need to give these 
companies more 
concessions in terms of 
production sharing. An 
example of such situation 
can be in the extraction of 
shale oil in two MENA 
locations identified to have 
substantial quantities.    
 
Chinese and East Asian 
economic growth increased their demand for oil from 
the MENA region over the past few years. This 
trend is expected to continue and increase in the 
following years as China continues to grow at 7% 
and subsequently at 4% 29. In a recent bid, China 
may have increased its trade in crude oil bought from 
the gulf area and may be encouraged to take a more 
active role in oil trading and pricing 30.  
 
The MENA region’s oil producers are increasingly 
concerned with the growing local demand for energy 
which reduces their capacity to get the revenues 
from oil exports. There is also a growing awareness 
of the importance of using clean non depletable 
energy for the future when oil reserves are reduced. 
UAE 31 and other Gulf States started programs for 
implementing solar energy at a wide scale. Several 
other MENA countries have had varying degrees of 
progress in using solar and wind power. Nuclear 
power generation has also been considered in some 
                                                   28
 Prof.	  E.	  Roger	  Owen,	  “One	  Hundred	  Years	  of	  Middle	  Eastern	  Oil”, Middle	  East	  Brief,	  Crown	  Center	  for	  Middle	  East	  Studies,	  Brandeis	  University,	  No.	  24,	  Jan	  2008.	  PP6 
29	  BP	  Energy	  Outlook	  2035,	  Feb.	  2015,	  Op.cit,	  pp	  9.	  
30	  The	  Oxford	  Institute	  for	  Energy	  Studies	  “Eastward-­‐
Shifting-­‐Oil-­‐Markets-­‐and-­‐the-­‐Future-­‐of-­‐Middle-­‐
Eastern-­‐Benchmarks”	  July	  2015.	  
31	   	   Linda	   low,	   Abu	   Dhabi's	   vision	   2030,	   	   World	  
Scientific,	  2012	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MENA countries with various degrees of progress 
due to the high safety requirement and the political 
unrest in the region  
The continued political unrest in the MENA region 
is part of the reason for the creation and growth of 
ISIS in several locations in the MENA region. Oil 
smuggling has been used to finance its operation and 
expansion. This pattern is expected to be reduced in 
the coming years as government control and peace is 
regained in these areas. 
 
Conclusion 
There will be progressively growing demand for oil 
in the foreseen future. This will push the oil prices up 
to an initially balanced level. This level is expected 
to be determined by this demand and the needs of 
countries producing and supplying the cheaper oil.   
A ceiling value for this price would probably be the 
price of production of the expensive types to limit 
the supplied quantities to the market.  
 
There is a continuing and growing shift in demand 
eastwards which will affect the future oil trade and 
prices. 
 
ACTIVITIES 
 
EUCERS Executive Energy Seminar 2015 
Kalina K. Damianova 
 
In July 2015, the European Centre for Energy and 
Resource Security (EUCERS) King’s College 
London in cooperation with King’s Summer School 
offered the EUCERS Executive Energy Seminar 
(EEES). The proven success of the previous three 
years has motivated us to gather again energy experts 
and academics, energy executives and private and 
public institutions representatives to discuss the 
increasingly interdependent dynamics of the global 
energy developments and international political and 
security trends. 
 
From 13 to 17th of July, in the iconic building of 
Somerset House the "Changes and Challenges in 
International Energy Markets" seminar took place, 
chaired by Dr Frank Umbach, Associate Director at 
EUCERS. Participants from various sectors of the 
energy field had the opportunity to benefit from the 
insights of the speakers on different contemporary 
issues, facing the energy industry and policy on 
strategic and operational level. Each session was 
followed by a Q&A and further discussions, when 
the participants could exchange opinions and share 
their experience. The topics of the sessions ranged 
from international market, climate, policy and 
security trends to regional spotlights, such as the 
energy future of Ukraine, Iraqi Kurdistan, 
Kazakhstan and Russia. Additionally, EU level 
focused topics, such as the creation of the Energy 
Union, the diversification initiatives and the example 
of the German ‘Energiewende’ were presented. 
 
Dr Frank Umbach, EUCERS Associate Director, 
provided the participants with a comprehensive 
overview on changes and challenges in international 
energy markets, looking into the influential trends on 
global and regional levels. The presentation triggered 
discussions about on-going issues, such as the fall of 
the oil prices and the redirection of the energy flows.  
In this regard, the debate was complemented by Dr 
Benny Peiser's, Director, The Global Warming 
Policy Foundation, presentation on Climate Change 
vs. Energy Demand, topic that affects the energy 
sector on global and regional level. In the context of 
the environmental debate and energy developments, 
Mr Michael Feist, CEO of enercity – Municipal 
Utilities Hanover, Germany, gave a detailed 
presentation on the benefits and challenges of the 
German “Energiewende’’ and on how it could be 
related to the other European states. 
In terms of the EU, Matthias Dürr, Head of RWE 
AG Representation in Brussels, gave a timely 
Kalina K. Damianova is one of 
the two 2014/2015 KAS Energy 
Security Fellows at EUCERS. 
She is conducting her research on 
Iran in the context of 
(re)emerging energy superpowers. 
Kalina also holds an MA with 
distinction in International Peace 
& Security from King’s.   
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analysis of the Energy Union and the New Market 
Design. The EU Diversification Strategy, one of the 
key strands of the EU energy security strategy was 
an area, presented by Dr Tomas Maltby, Lecturer in 
International Politics, King’s College London. He 
focused on the energy diversification projects of the 
EU, in the context of the end of South Stream, the 
future role of the Southern Corridor and the East 
Mediterranean Sea Resources. 
 
Europe’s energy security has been inevitably affected 
by the on-going conflict in Ukraine. The in-depth 
expertise of Dr Umbach on Eastern Europe and EU-
Russia relations made his presentation on Ukraine’s 
energy security future a comprehensive lecture, 
contributing to the participants' understanding of the 
challenges in the region. An essential topic for a 
discussion on the EU energy security is the future of 
the energy supplies to the EU from one of its main 
partners in this field - Russia. Dr Adnan Vatansever, 
Senior Lecturer, King’s Russia Institute and 
Associate Director at EUCERS, gave a detailed 
expert analysis on the Russian energy sector and its 
future perspectives in the context of the energy 
supplies to Europe and the sanctions imposed on 
Moscow. An overview of the energy potential and 
sector specifications of another potential energy 
superpower in Eurasia, Kazakstan, has been made by 
Aura Sabadus, Senior Reporter, ICIS and EUCERS 
Research Associate. 
 
In relation to the emerging energy superpowers, 
which is the topic of the 2014/2015 
EUCERS/ISD/KAS Workshop Series, a special 
event was dedicated to Brazil. One of our KAS 
fellows, Flavio Lira, working on a study on Brazil, 
presented his findings on a panel of officials and 
experts on Latin America and Brazil. The EEES 
participants could join our event and take part in the 
debate afterwards, which was followed by a 
reception. 
 
Iraqi Kurdistan, another energy wealthy zone, was 
analysed by the Managing Director of Carduchi 
Consulting, Shwan Zulal in a very insightful 
presentation. Inevitably, the discussions were 
influenced by the current events on the international 
stage, such as the reaching of a permanent agreement 
with Iran and the potential of the lifting of the 
international sanctions imposed on this energy rich 
state. The political and security challenges, one of 
the key problems for the energy sector on almost all 
levels, were a topic of analysis of Mohammed 
Shakeel, Middle East Analyst, Global Strategy and 
Business Development, Statoil, London. He focused 
on the Political Risk in the Oil and Gas Industry. Dr 
Umbach contributed to the wider debate of security 
challenges by introducing into the discussion a 
comprehensive presentation on the emerging threats, 
namely the ones of Cyber Security. The place that 
NATO could play in the energy security field was 
discussed by Michael Ruehle, Head of Energy 
Security Section, Emerging Security Challenges 
Division, North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). 
 
The executive energy seminar week was concluded 
by a presentation and discussion on the topic of 
Alternative Energy Dispute Resolutions. Professor 
Dr Nicole Conrad, Director of the Energy 
Arbitration Center Switzerland (EACS) at the 
ZHAW, familiarised the audience with the legal 
mechanisms and possible challenges that might be 
encountered in Energy dispute resolution. On the 
final day of the EEES a lunch, followed by a small 
informal ceremony of certificates awarding was 
organised. 
EUCERS also offered a visit to the London Eye, one 
of the most popular tourist attractions in London. 
The participants had the opportunity to have dinners 
together and share opinions in a more informal 
atmosphere, as well.  
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The EUCERS team was delighted to welcome all 
participants and speakers to this year’s executive 
energy seminar and are looking forward to organize 
the next executive energy seminar in 2016. We 
would like to thank the Chairman of the programme 
Dr Frank Umbach, the presenters and the 
participants and Carola Gegenbauer, EUCERS head 
of operations and organiser of the EEES for making 
this seminar a valuable experience for all. 
 
DISCLAIMER 
The views expressed in this Newsletter are strictly those of 
the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the 
European Centre for Energy and Resource Security 
(EUCERS), its affiliates or King’s College London. 
 
 
ANNOUNCEMENT	  This	   will	   be	   the	   last	   Newsletter	  issue	   edited	   by	   Jan-­‐Justus	  Andreas,	   KAS	   Fellow	   at	   EUCERS	  2013/14	  and	  EUCERS	  Newsletter	  Editor	   since	   November	   2013.	  Justus	   has	   been	   doing	   a	  remarkable	   job	   editing	   the	  newsletter	   in	   the	   past	   two	   years	  and	  we	  would	   like	   to	   thank	   him	  sincerely	  for	  all	  his	  hard	  work.	  Justus	  will	  now	  focus	  on	   his	   doctoral	   research	   at	   the	   University	   of	   York	  and	   we	   wish	   him	   the	   very	   best	   for	   his	   future	  endeavours	  and	  are	  delighted	  to	  keep	  him	  associated	  to	  EUCERS	  as	  a	  Research	  Associate.	  
	  
	  
EUCERS	  ON	  THE	  ROAD	  
Our team represents EUCERS at various conferences and 
events all over the world. This section gives a regular update 
and overview of conferences and interview contributions by 
EUCERS Director Professor Dr Friedbert Pflüger, Research 
Director Dr Frank Umbach and Associate Director Dr 
Adnan Vantansever. 
13.08.2015 
Berlin, 
Germany 
Friedbert gave a lecture at the "German 
Russian Summer School“ hosted by 
EUREF on „Germany & Russia: A 
partnership in energy for half a century – 
and for the future“ 
	  
 
PUBLICATIONS	  
Dr Frank Umbach share with us his most recent 
publications and interviews: 
 
Frank wrote on “Baltic Energy Security  - No 
Longer a Regional Energy Island”, at the 
Geopolitical Information Service (GIS - 
www.geopolitical-info.com), 7 August 2015, 6 pp.  
 
Frank discussed “Falling Oil Prices and the Geo-
economic Impacts on the International Oil Market”, 
published in the Diplomatic Journal for Global 
Energy Cooperation, first edition (ed. by the South 
Korean Foreign Ministry), Vol. 01/2015, pp. 48-57 
(http://www.mofa.go.kr/trade/Energy/20110915/e
ne.pdf).)	  
 
SOCIAL MEDIA 
Fol low @eucers on Twitter 
L ike us on Facebook!  
 
CONTACT EUCERS 
If you have found our Newsletter interesting, wish to hear 
more about our activities, or, indeed, contribute with ideas 
or essays, please contact Carola Gegenbauer, Operations 
Coordinator EUCERS on carola.gegenbauer@kcl.ac.uk or 
call 020 7848 1912. 
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EUCERS ADVISORY BOARD 
The EUCERS Advisory Board supports the activities of 
EUCERS King’s College London. We would like to thank and 
present the members of the board. 
 
Professor Theo Farrel l ,  Chairman of the Board, Head 
of War Studies Department and Professor of War in the 
Modern World, King’s College London 
Marco Arcel l i , Executive Vice President, Upstream Gas, 
Enel, Rom  
Professor Dr Hüseyin Bagci, Department Chair of 
International Relations, Middle East Technical   University 
Inonu Bulvari, Ankara    
Andrew Bart lett,	   Managing Director, Bartlett Energy 
Advisers	  
Volker Beckers, Chairman, Spenceram Limited 
Professor Dr Albert Bressand, Professor in 
International Strategic Management in Energy, University of 
Groningen 
Professor Dr Iu l ian Chifu, Advisor to the Romanian 
President for Strategic Affairs, Security and Foreign Policy 
and President of the Center for Conflict Prevention and 
Early Warning, Bucharest   
Dr John Chipman, Director of the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies (IISS), London 
Professor Dr Dieter Helm, University of Oxford 
Professor Dr Karl  Kaiser, Director of the Program on 
Transatlantic Relations of the Weatherhead Center for 
International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, 
USA 
Frederick Kempe, President and CEO, Atlantic Council, 
Washington, D.C., USA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I lya Kochevrin, Executive Director of Gazprom Export Ltd 
Janusz Luks, CEO Central Europe Energy Partners 
(CEEP), Brussels/Warsaw 
Thierry de Montbria l , Founder and President of the 
Institute Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), Paris  
Chris Mottershead, Vice-Principal (Research & 
Development), King's College London 
Hi ldegard Mül ler, Chair of the Executive Board of the 
German Association of Energy and Water Industry (BDEW) 
and member of the Executive Committee  
Dr Pierre Noël,  Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah Senior Fellow for 
Economic and Energy Security, IISS Asia 
Dr L ig ia Noronha, Director Resources, Regulation and 
Global Security, TERI, New Delhi 
Deepak Puri , Chairman & Managing Director, Moser Baer 
India Ltd., Delhi 
Janusz Reiter, Center for International Relations, Warsaw 
Professor Dr Karl  Rose, Senior Fellow Scenarios, 
World Energy Council, Vienna/London 
Professor Dr Burkhard Schwenker, Chairman of the 
Supervisory Board, Roland Berger Strategy Consultants 
GmbH, Hamburg 
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